

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 276242

50

ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 NRC-05

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 /094 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/OSD

APPROVED BY C:HSNENFELDT

JCS:GENELDER

NSC:RBOVERIE

ACDA:JLEHMAN

OSD:JWADE

S/S- MR. ORTIZ

----- 114340

O R 211957Z NOV 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 276242

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: RECIPROCAL LIMITS

REFS: LONDON 15566, BONN 16654, NATO 5481

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. THE US OPTION III PROPOSAL INCLUDED LIMITS ON SOVIET
NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE WITHDRAWN BY THE US.

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 276242

SPECIFICALLY, THE US, IN ITS PAPER "US VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS
IN MBFR" SAID THAT:

-- ANALOGOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO

INCREASE SO AS "TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT;"

-- TO ACHIEVE RECIPROCAL LIMITS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS,
WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT LIMITS ON US TANKS;

-- THE LIMITS ON US TANKS WOULD BE FORMULATED TO PERMIT
MODEST INCREASES ABOVE CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED LEVELS; IT WAS
SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COULD HAVE A SIMILAR
DEGREE OF FREEDOM.

2- THE US HAS ALWAYS VIEWED THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF SUCH
LIMITS ON THE SOVIETS AS LIMITED, CONSIDERING THE SIZE AND
MOBILITY OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN MILITARY
DISTRICTS OF THE USSR. THE LIMITATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN EN-

VISAGED WOULD NOT AFFECT THE MAJORITY OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR
THREAT TO THE NGA, SUCH AS IRBMS, MRBMS AND MEDIUM BOM-
BERS LOCATED IN THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, THE US POSITION
REFLECTED OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF WITH-
DRAWING AND LIMITING SOME TYPES OF US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
WHILE NOT PUTTING SOME CONSTRAINTS ON ANALOGOUS SOVIET
SYSTEMS.

3. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ALLIES EXPECT SOME FURTHER US
COMMENT ON THIS ISSUE. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECIPROCAL LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS AND
SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. TO DATE, SHAPE HAS ENDORSED THE
CONCEPT OF RECIPROCAL LIMITS AND THE SENIOR POLITICAL
COMMITTEE HAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED DRAFT NEGOTIATING
GUIDANCE CALLING FOR RECIPROCAL LIMITS. ONLY THE FRG HAS
BRACKETED THE WORDS "SO AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE
AGREEMENT," WHICH IT CONTENTS ARE VAGUE. WE ARE ALSO
AWARE (FROM REFTELS) THAT MISSION AND EMBASSIES BONN AND
LONDON BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD ACCEPT A CHANGED US
POSITION DELETING LIMITS ON RECIPROCAL ELEMENTS FROM THE
ALLIED POSITION.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 276242

4. PROPOSING RECIPROCAL LIMITS DOES HAVE CERTAIN DIS-
ADVANTAGES:

-- EFFORTS TO LIMIT EQUIPMENT WHICH IS NOT REDUCED WOULD
FURTHER STIMULATE THE EAST TO PRESS ITS DEMAND FOR RE-
DUCTIONS AND LIMITS ON ALLIED EQUIPMENT.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS SPECIFIC OPTION III APPROACH,
ACCEPTING LIMITS ON US TANKS WOULD LOGICALLY BE A NECESSARY
CONCOMITANT OF LIMITS ON SOVIET NUCLEARS. IF LIMITS ON
US TANKS RESULTED (EVEN AT A LEVEL WELL ABOVE THE CURRENT
US LEVEL BUT BELOW THE SOVIET LEVEL), THIS WOULD FORECLOSE
SOME US OPTIONS TO INCREASE ITS TANKS AND WOULD GIVE

LEGAL STATUS TO THE DISPARITY BETWEEN US AND SOVIET ARMOR LEVELS IN EUROPE.

-- REQUIRING A CONSTRAINT ON THE SOVIETS' NUCLEAR ELEMENTS WOULD REDUCE THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF OUR PROPOSAL TO THE SOVIETS.

5. THERE ARE ALSO POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES TO SUCH LIMITS:

-- LIMITING THE NUMBER OF SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT DEPLOYED IN THE NGA COULD ENHANCE CREDIBLE WARNING TIME AND DECREASE THE SOVIETS' EARLY FIGHTING CAPABILITIES. THERE

WOULD BE, HOWEVER, A PROBLEM IN AGREEING WHICH SOVIET AIRCRAFT ARE NUCLEAR CAPABLE.

-- CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET NUCLEARS COULD DIMINISH PROBLEMS WITH POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERCEPTIONS THAT

MIGHT BE CAUSED BY A SITUATION IN WHICH SOME US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE AREA WERE LIMITED WITHOUT ANY SUCH LIMITS ON THE SOVIETS.

-- LIMITS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IF PRECISE AND VERIFIABLE WOULD PRECLUDE OR INHIBIT A BUILDUP IN THE NGA OF THOSE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS LIMITED.

6. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, WE HAVE RECONSIDERED THIS
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 276242

MATTER. WE NOW BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD OPPOSE RECIPROCAL LIMITATIONS ON US TANKS. FURTHER, WE SHOULD DEFER THE

QUESTION OF ASKING FOR LIMITS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE NGA PENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. WE NOW BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK ALLIED AGREEMENT TO SEEK AN EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE OPTION III REDUCTION OFFER IN TERMS OF ITS ACCEPTABILITY AS A PACKAGE PROPOSAL DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A MORE STABLE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE THROUGH REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND EASTERN COMMITMENT TO A COMMON CEILING. IN ADDITION, WE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR A PAUSE BETWEEN DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS AND DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ANY LIMITATIONS. ONCE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO OUR REDUCTION PROPOSAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR CAPITALS BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH DISCUSSIONS ON LIMITATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF REVISED PARAS 6, 7, 8 AND 9 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE. WHILE THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID GETTING INTO THE DETAILS OF LIMITATIONS, IF PRESSED BY THE EAST, THEY CAN INDICATE THAT NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE ALLIES' OFFER AND THAT AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE CERTAIN ELEMENTS INCLUDES

IMPLICITLY A CEILING ON THOSE ELEMENTS AT THE REDUCED LEVEL.

8. EMBASSIES BONN AND LONDON SHOULD DRAW ON ABOVE PARAS AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL. IF FRG AND UK ARE AGREEABLE, WE WOULD PROPOSE APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION IN THE DRAFT GUIDANCE AS FOLLOWS. PARA 14 OF POSITION PAPER WOULD BE DELETED.

BEGIN TEXT OF PARAS OF DRAFT GUIDANCE.

"5. AS NECESSARY TO MEET EASTERN PRESSURE, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS IN DETAIL THE ISSUES OF WHAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATIONS ONLY AFTER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN EXPLORED. THEY SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO GO INTO THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE IN DETAIL UNTIL THEY HAVE RECEIVED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE TO WHETHER THE EAST IS WILLING TO CONSIDER

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 276242

POSITIVELY THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. FURTHERMORE, BECAUSE THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS IS A HIGHLY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT ONE, SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD PREMATURELY SIDETRACK THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO DETAIL. IF PRESSED BY THE EAST, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS CAN INDICATE THAT AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE CERTAIN ELEMENTS INCLUDES IMPLICITLY A CEILING ON THOSE ELEMENTS AT THE REDUCED LEVEL. IF FURTHER PRESSED CONCERNING NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT, THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE CLEAR AS APPROPRIATE THAT NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE NATO OFFER.

"6. SUBSEQUENTLY, IF THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS, HAVING PROVIDED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE, PRESS FOR DETAILS AND IF, IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS THE RESPONSE SHOWS SERIOUS EASTERN INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE BASIC ELEMENTS AS CONTAINED IN PARA 1, THE AD HOC GROUP SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE NATURE OF THE EASTERN RESPONSE AND THE TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN PROCEEDING WITH A DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS, AND AFTER RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS FROM CAPITALS, PROCEED TO OUTLINE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES AND THE SUBSTANCE OF PARAS 7, 8, AND 9BELOW.

-- THE US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES OF OVER 500 KM RANGE, AND US AIRCRAFT OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS;

-- THE NUMBER OF EACH OF THESE US ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS COULD NOT EXCEED THE NUMBER IN THE AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS

TO PERMIT NORMAL TRAINING AND EXERCISES.

"7. AS PART OF THE DISCUSSION OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD

BE LIMITED TO THE NUMBER REMAINING AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

"8. IF THE EAST ASKS IF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSED ON US TANKS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 276242

THAT CONSTRAINT ON THE LEVEL OF US MAIN BATTLE TANKS IS NOT PART OF THE OFFER.

"9. IF THE EAST SEEKS STILL FURTHER DETAILS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT CLEARLY FURTHER DETAILS WOULD NEED TO BE AGREED, E.G., ON WHICH US AIRCRAFT MODELS AND SOVIET TANK MODELS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMIT; ON EXCEPTIONS FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES, ETC." END TEXT OF GUIDANCE MODIFICATIONS.

9. IN THE POSITION PAPER, ADD THE FOLLOWING BETWEEN PARAS 11 AND 12: BEGIN TEXT: "THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US TO MAINTAIN LEVELS NOT EXCEEDING THE RESIDUAL NUMBER OF THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS REDUCED IS RELATED TO SOVIET RESTRAINT IN THE DEPLOYMENT IN THE NGA OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND ON US TANKS ARE NOT PART OF THE NATO OPTION III PROPOSAL. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO CONSTRAIN SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE NGA THROUGH MBFR SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL WE HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF EASTERN REACTION TO THE BASIC REDUCTION PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN OPTION III." END TEXT.

10. MISSION MAY INFORM UK AND FRG NATO REPS OF ABOVE. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TANKS (COMBAT VEHICLES), NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 NOV 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE276242
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/OSD
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750406-0734
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751190/baaaadcx.tel
Line Count: 256
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <17 SEP 2003 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PARM, US, UR, NATO, MBFR
To: NATO
LONDON
BONN INFO MBFR VIENNA
MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006